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porate assets, the cause of action is exclusively the corporation's, without regard to an existing contractual relationship between stockholder and corporation.18 In the Carter
case the more appropriate action would seem to have been
a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. 9 This is
particularly important because of the limited situations in
which minority stockholders could prove that the injury
they allegedly suffered was not likewise experienced by
the other stockholders. The derivative suit appears to provide substantial advantage to the stockholder by eliminating the necessity for establishing privity of contract, and,
at the same time, by permitting the individual stockholder
to enjoin or redress the wrongful act.
While the holding of the Carter decision is faulty in
part, it does have the important effect of giving clear recognition to the basic concept underlying Federal security
regulation: that the corporation and its representatives are
held to the highest standards of care and good faith in their
dealings with the public. The corporation is not only liable
for its misrepresentations, but is contractually bound by
the language of its prospectus where it is reasonably construed as a statement of intent.
Guy B.

MASERITZ

Qualifying Terms And Relief For Deficiency
In Quantity In Land Sales
Carozza v. Peacock Land Corp.'
The court appointed trustee for Peacock Land Corporation advertised a mortgage foreclosure sale, describing the
property as fronting approximately three hundred thirty
feet on York Road in Baltimore County. Prior to the execution of the mortgage, a portion of the property had been
deeded to Baltimore County, with the result that the
trustee could only convey property fronting two hundred
twenty-six feet on York Road at the time of the sale.
,to the property of a corporation or for impairment or destruction of its
business is in the corporation, and such an injury, although it may diminish
the ,alue of the capital stock, is not primarily or necessarily a damage to
the stockholder, and hence the stockholder's derivative right can be asserted
only through the corporation." Waller v. Waller, supra.
1B13 FLETCHim, aupra note 17.
'

Id. § 5829.

'231 Md. 112, 188 A. 2d 917 (1963).
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Appellants, who bought the property at the foreclosure,
excepted to ratification of the sale on the ground that a
mistake resulted from the misrepresentation. Appellees
claimed that the frontage distances had been qualified by
'approximately" and that the purchaser had therefore
assumed the risk of a deficiency in quantity. In the alternative appellees claimed that caveat emptor applied. The
Court of Appeals sustained appellants' exceptions by distinguishing the term "approximately" from "more or less"
and determining that the purchasers had not assumed the
risk of a deficiency in quantity. The court also ruled that
caveat emptor does not apply in judicial sales prior to
ratification.
The problem often arises of construing contracts for the
sale of land in gross' containing statements of quantity,
acreage or frontage, qualified by such words as "approximately", "about", or "more or less". The cases vary as to
the effect of these terms where relief is sought for a
deficiency in quantity, but generally hold the terms themselves to be equivalent.3 However, the Maryland Court of
Appeals, in construing the term "approximately" for the
first time, did distinguish it from "more or less".
In the majority of jurisdictions, such qualifying terms
present no great problem of construction. They are con-'4
strued as "intended to cover a reasonable excess or deficit."
They are not considered to preclude claims of mistake,
requests for abatement or suits for damages when there is
an unreasonable discrepancy between the estimate and the
actual acreage or frontage.5 In determining what is reasonable, general principles of contract construction are
applied in an attempt to determine the intent of the parties.
The qualifying terms are considered in connection with all
' A sale in gross is one in which the purchase price is based upon a tract
of land as a whole and not upon a particular number of acres. Therefore.
quantity is not the essence of the contract. 'Such a sale has been described
as a "contract of hazard." Kriel v. Cullison, 165 Md. 402, 408, 169 Atl. 203
(1933). The sale has also been described as one in which "there is no
express or implied warranty as to quantity." Terry v. Rich, 197 Ala. 486,
73 So. 76 (1916).
' E.g., Alexander v. Hicks, 242 Ala. 243, 5 So. 24 781, 782 (1942) ; Quindt
v. Kilpatrick, 96 Cal. App. 2d 824, 216 P. 2d 481, 482 (1950); Harris v.
Harang, 23 So. 2d 786, 790 (La. App. 1945); 8 Thompson Real Property
§ 4580, at 525 (perm. ed. 1940).
'Sims v. Haggard, 162 Tex. 307, 346 S.W. 2d 110, 115 (1961); accord
e.g., Brewer v. Schammerhorn, 183 Kan. 739, 332 P. 2d 526, 531 (1958);
see Annot. 1 A.L.R. 2d 9 at 90 (1948). This annotation on mistake and
sales in gross contains an extensive discussion of the effect of qualifying
terms. Comment, Mutual Mistake as Ground for Relief in a Contract for
the Sale of Land in Gross, 25 Texas L. Rev. 165 (1946).
See Enequist v. Bemis, 115 Vt. 209, 55 A. 2d 617, 620, 1 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1947).
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other factors in a particular case.6 Among other factors frequently considered are the nature and quality of the land,7
the main object of the sale,8 the method of stating the price, s
and the amount of the purchase price. 10 Some cases actually
give a very narrow effect to the qualifying words, construing them to be "words of safety and precaution, intended to
cover some slight or unimportant inaccuracy.""
On the other hand, there are some jurisdictions in which
a very broad effect is given to the qualifying terms. In
these jurisdictions no relief is granted, in the absence of
fraud, for a shortage of quantity when the statements of
quantity are modified by such terms as "about", "approximately", and "more or less". 2 Rather than considering
such words as one factor in determining the intent of the
parties, these courts apparently construe the terms to mean
that the vendee has assumed the risk of any deficiency
in quantity.
Although in the earliest Maryland cases no disproportionate weight was given to the presence of qualifying
terms," there are a series of later decisions in which the
term "more or less" was construed to mean that the vendee
had assumed the risk of any deficiency in quantity. 4 This
latter construction stemmed from the case of Jones v.
Plater where the court said that "unless the words 'more
6Russo v. Corideo, 102 Oonn. 663, 129 At. 849 (1925) ; Coble v. Agnew,
128 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1961) ; Burke v. Smith, 57 Okla. 196, 157 P. 51, 53 (1916).
See Raben v. Risnikoff, 95 App. Div. 68, 88 N.Y.S. 470, 471 (1904)
where the court quoted Siebel v. Cohen, 54 N.Y. Super. Ct. 436 (1887) :
a "'difference of a few inches more or less in the lines within which a city
lot is b ounded might cause a difference in pecuniary value exceeding that
of acres of farm land'."
8 See Pollack v. Wilson, 33 Ky. 25 (1835). Here the court determined
that a mill seat was the principal inducement to the purchase and that
the rest of the land was of little value or importance.
I Hill v. Johnson, 214 Ala. 194, 106 So. 814, 816 (1925). "That the land
is valuable in proportion to acreage, and not by reason of special improvements, and that the price is in round figures, such as $2,500 for 500 acres,
more or less, are circumstances indicating that area was a material basis
of the contract."
1268, 168 N.W. 814 (1918) where the
10 See Gardner v. Kiburz, 184 Ia.
court granted relief for a deficiency of three percent in acreage, emphasizing that three percent of the purchase price was $1500.
u Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Surowski, 164 Pa. Super. 383,
64 A. 2d 854, 856 (1949) ; accord, Pierce v. Lefort, 197 La. 1, 200 So. 801,
803 (1941) ; Parrow v. Proulx, 111 Vt. 274, 15 A. 2d 835, 838 (1940).
Spires v. Nix, 256 Ala. 642, 57 So. 2d 89 (1952) ; Young v. Bradshaw,
224 Ark. 467, 274 S.W. 2d 466 (1955) ; Salyer v. Poulos, 276 Ky. 143, 122
S.W. 2d 996 (1938).
13Brown v. Wallace, 4 G & J 479 (Md. 1832); Andrews v. Scotton, 2
629 (Md. 1830) ; Hoffman v. Johnson, 1 Bland 103 (Md. 1826).
Bland
1
Tyson v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 305 (1868) ; Hall v. Mayhew, 15 Md. 551
(1860) ; Smallwood v. Hatton, 4 Md. Ch. 95 (1853); Hurt v. Stull, 3 Md.
Ch. 24 (1849), aff'd, 9 Gill 446 (Md. 1851) ; Jones v. Plater, 2 Gill 125, 41
Am. Dec. 408 (Md. 1844).
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or less' lead to such a conclusion, they are useless and insensible."' 5 Dictum in the Jones case recognized the possiin quantity warrantbility of a sufficiently large deficiency
6
ing relief on the basis of mistake. The later case of Hurt
v. Stull 17 followed this decision, but added dictum to the
effect that relief could only be granted in instances of fraud,
thereby failing to accept the dictum of the Jones case. The
Court of Appeals in the instant case avoided these decisions
by distinguishing the term "approximately" from "more
or less".
An examination of the more recent Maryland cases reveals that it was unnecessary to distinguish between "more
or less" and "approximately", as the Hurt and Jones cases
In Baltimore Permaare no longer good law in Maryland.
5 the court was required
nent Bldg. & Land Soc'y v. Smith,"
to construe the phrase "about sixty-five acres": No attempt
was made to distinguish the term "about" from "more or
less". All circumstances surrounding the sale were considered and damages were granted for the deficiency in
quantity. After the Land Soc'y case, there were a series of
decisions involving the phrase "more or less" in which
language similar to that of the court in the Hurt case was
used.' 9 In none of these cases, however, was the term arbitrarily construed without regard to other circumstances.
A definite break was made from the Jones line of decisions
in Kriel v. Cullison, where it was held that the words
"more or less", "when used to qualify a representation of
quantity... will be construed... as indicating an intention on the part of the parties . . . to assume the risk of
quantity, which, until rebutted by evidence of a different
intent inherent in the instrument or extrinsic to it, will be
recognized and enforced."2 0 This statement represents a
Supra note 14, at 127. The court relied on a similar statement by
Justice Story in Stebbins v. Eddy, 22 Fed. Cas. 1192, 1195 (No. 13,342)
(C.C.D.R.I. 1827).

11Id. at 128.
"73 Md. Ch. 24 (1849), aff'd, 9 Gill 446 (Md. 1851).
The court construed "about" as
1854 Md. 187, 39 Am. Rep. 374 (1880).
importing "that the actual quantity is a near approximation to that mentioned, that is 'to say, within a fraction of an acre, or perhaps it might
cover a discrepancy of one or two acres." Supra at 204. This case Was
cited with approval in Md. Constr. Co. v. Kuper, 90 Md' 529, 45 Atl. 197
(1900), although relief was denied due to the small quantity of the
deficiency.
"Neavitt v. Lightner, 155 Md. 365, 142 At. 109 (1928) ; Musselman v.
Moxley, 152 Md. 13, 136 A. 48 (1927) ; Wagner v. Goodrich, 148 Md. 318,
129 A. 364 (1925).
(Emphasis added.) Vendee
2 165 Md. 402, 411-12, 169 Atl. 203 (1933).
contracted to buy tracts of land containing forty-five acres, more or less.
They actually contained only thirty-one acres with the major tract having
a deficiency of eight out of twenty acres. ,Kriel's testliony showed that
he was Interested only in frontage not in acreage, and that he knew the
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position similar to that of the majority of the states.
Qualifying phrases are merely one factor, albeit a strong
one, in determining whether relief will be granted.
Unfortunately, the latest case, Brodsky v. Hull,2 construing the phrase "more or less", returned to the phraseology of the Hurt case. Although using such phraseology
(that the vendee assumed the risk of quantity), the court
actually applied the "intent test" of the Kriel case in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to damages for
breach of contract.2" In dissenting, Judge Marbury criticized the majority for their reliance on phraseology in
century old cases and asked
for reiteration of the law as
23
stated in the Kriel case.
With the decision in Carozza v. Peacock Land Corp., the
Maryland Court of Appeals has now construed the qualifying terms most often used to modify statements of quantity
in land sale contracts. "About", as construed in Baltimore
Permanent Bldg. & Land Soc'y v. Smith, and "approximately", as construed in the instant case, are merely factors in determining the intent of the parties by normal
principles of contract construction. A similar construction
was placed on "more or less" in the Kriel case, although
this interpretation was weakened by the language in the
Brodsky case. Since "about", "more or less" and "approximately" are generally considered equivalent, the Court of
Appeals, by distinguishing "more or less" and "approximately", perhaps has missed an opportunity to reiterate
the Kriel case and clear away the complicating
vestiges of
25
24
Jones v. Plater

and Hurt v. Stull.

LE M. MILLER
boundaries of the property he was buying. The court decided that Kriel's
testimony, the manner of describing the premises, and the use of "more
or less" combined to show the statement of quantity was merely descriptive. Plaintiff was granted specific performance. Kriel, however, received
an abatement for the deficiency in quantity.
21 196 Md. 509, 514, 77 A. 2d 156 (1949). A house was advertised as containing -a one acre lot. Vendee inspected it and offered to buy, insisting
that a statement of acreage be included in the contract. The lot contained
only .46 acres and the vendee sued for breach of contract. No damages
were awarded. In his dissent, Chief Judge Marbury relied heavily on the
Kriel and Land Soe'y cases, arguing that plaintiff had shown sufficient
evidence of an intent to make quantity material.
Id., at 516. The court said that plaintiff had inspected the lot twice,
had time to check for acreage, and acquiesced in describing the lot as containing one acre, more or less. Furthermore, they said, the sale was for a
gross sum. The court went on to say that the "rule [that vendee assumed
the risk of quantity] does not bar ... a suit in equity for rescission ... or
abatement . . . [for] mutual mistake." Id. at 514-15.
2
Id. at 517.
"2 Gill 125, 41 Am. Dec. 408 (Md. 1844).
"3 Md. Ch. 24 (1849), aff'd, 9 Gill 446 (Md. 1851).

